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This paper provides evidence that attitudes towards redistribution are associated with the extent
of generosity of the redistributive context experienced by the individual, as measured by the
likelihood of receiving positive benefit transfers net of fiscal contribution. We estimate reduced
form tax-benefit equations with the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), and
match the implied parameters to the respondents of the European Social Survey (ESS) on the basis
of their characteristics. The period of analysis is 2008–2016. For identification, we exploit
exogenous cross-country and time variation in tax rules and market income to disentangle im-
plications of exposure to tax-benefit rules on preferences for redistribution from the effects of
changes in income inequality. We find that exposure to positive net benefits increases support for
redistribution by 1.4%–3% on baseline models, the effect being robust across a variety of
specifications.1. Introduction
Individuals form their attitudes towards income redistribution on the basis of multiple factors such as prior beliefs on distributive
justice, self-interest, inequality levels, as well as the extent of redistribution they actually face in the economy. Understanding whether
income redistribution has a separate impact on support for redistribution is of central importance for assessing the stability of political
support towards these measures. In recent decades, the sustained rise in income inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2013, 2017) has put
governments under pressure to implement redistributive measures that increase the generosity of the welfare state. These measures
include shifting the burden of taxation and re-allocating benefits across individuals, with some individuals gaining and other losing out
of this change. This aspect rises concerns about the political support for policy measures intended to combat inequality.
This paper investigates empirically if increasing the generosity of the tax-benefit system has an impact on preferences for redis-
tribution, as measured by the extent of support to government intervention to limit inequalities. Income-based motives alone would
suggest that, within a given society, rising generosity of redistribution increases support to redistribution among those who are in
perspective enjoying positive benefits net of taxes, whereas it reduces support for all those that are net contributors to the system. The
combined effect may be ambiguous, as long as it depends on the size of redistribution and the extent of inequality in the countryof Socio-Economic Research (LISER), Maison des Sciences Humaines, 11 Pt de Sciences, L4366,
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The links between inequality, preferences for redistribution, and the implied size and generosity of the taxation and social welfare
system have been studied in political economy literature. In seminal works, Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) show that,
under majority rule, the median voter is decisive in pushing for more redistribution when the median income is sufficiently lower than
the mean income, i.e. in presence of income inequality. Empirical evidence about the positive relation between inequality and demand
for redistribution is mixed (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Karabarbounis, 2011; Corneo and Neher, 2015). This reflect the different
bearings of a multiplicity of motives for demand for redistribution.
Inequality in gross incomes captures market income risk and may be positively associated with demand for redistribution if motives
for insurance are dominating, as shown in the lab experiment by Durante et al. (2014), whereas the relation turns negative when
positional concerns are at stake. For instance, the political influence of economic elites (the top of the income distribution) may prevent
the realization of redistribution through lower taxes (this is the “one dollar, one vote” equilibrium found by Karabarbounis, 2011).
Furthermore, under the “last-place aversion” hypothesis developed by Kuziemko et al. (2015), low-income individuals may oppose
redistribution if they believe this helps individuals just below them in the income distribution (see also Kim, 2019). Individuals may also
prefer redistribution taking place locally above them and in the top, i.e. reducing incomes of individuals located just above them in the
income distribution and in the top of the distribution (Fisman et al., 2018). The role of perceptions and informational bias have been also
addressed (Schokkaert and Truyts, 2017; Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018; Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017).
When the focus is on consumption and well-being (incorporating effects of market income risk and public intervention, given
disposable income), insurance motives may be counterbalanced by income expectations. The Prospect of Upper Mobility (POUM)
hypothesis (Benabou and Ok, 2001), for instance, predicts that relatively poor individuals with expectations of upward mobility would
favour lower taxes, less redistribution and therefore more inequality. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) find evidence that objective
measures of upward mobility in income lead to similar conclusion (see also Checchi and Filippin, 2004), whereas Corneo and Grüner
(2002) show the implications of positional expectations. Overall, insurance motives may imply more support for redistribution in
response to a more generous welfare state, whereas income expectations and positional concerns may induce a negative effect.
As noted by Piketty (1995), differences in beliefs about the relative importance of effort and luck in generating income inequality
may also explain different attitudes towards inequality and redistribution. In an influential paper, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) argue
that even two identical societies displaying a preference for fairness (i.e. they tolerate income inequality insofar it reflects inequality in
effort and talents) may end up choosing one of two very different redistribution schemes at equilibrium: either low taxes and redis-
tribution when individual effort is believed to be the main source of income, or high taxes and redistribution when, instead, luck de-
termines income. Di Tella and Dubra (2013) notice that to obtain multiplicity of equilibria it is necessary and meaningful to consider
some redistribution even in the presence of a fair allocation of resources. When fairness motives prevail, a rise in welfare state generosity
may correspond to a rising demand for redistribution if income inequality is driven by luck, whereas actual demand for redistribution
shrinks when taxes and benefits compensate for fair inequalities.
This paper contributes to this literature by providing empirical evidence about the extent at which generosity of the welfare state
shapes individual preferences for redistribution. Generosity is captured by the likelihood of being a net benefit recipient and by the level
of benefits net of taxes accruing at individual level. We argue that taxes and benefits account, on the one hand, for the degree of exposure
of the individuals to the shape of the tax-benefit system and to redistribution (as captured by objective parameters) and, on the other
hand, for differences across societies in setting the redistribution parameters driving public spending.
A parsimonious way to model generosity of the welfare state is by rationalizing taxation through a flat-tax basic-income scheme, the
basic income component representing benefits accruing to the individual. Assignment of the benefits may be random given income of
the applicant, reflecting uncertainty in the assignment rules (which may depend on income realizations of eligible subpopulations). For
poor people, likely those being net benefits recipients, a rise in generosity may have implications both on the extensive margins, rising
the probability of being allocated with benefits, and the intensive margin, by rising the proportion of fiscal revenues allocated as cash
benefits. Incorporating both extensive and intensive margins for benefits attribution within the model in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
would reveal that exogenously rising the probability of receiving positive benefits net of taxes, as well as increasing the size of net
benefits, also rises support for redistribution.1 The prediction follows from considering risk averse individuals that are exclusively
interested about maximizing own consumption, whereas the sign of the effect may be different if positional concerns or fairness views
are taken into account.1 Consider gross individual income ~y as stochastic (with population average y). A tax τ is collected on every unit of gross income and redistributed.
With probability π the agent receives a benefit bτy and with probability 1 π this benefit is zero. The parameter b 2 ½0; 1 represents the intensive
margin of generosity. The agent's net income (consumption) is ~yd ¼ ð1  τÞ~y þ πbτy τ2y2 , the last term representing cost of administration and
disincentives from taxation. We assume (for simplicity) that individual preferences EU follow the rank-dependent representation: EUð~yÞ ¼R
½0;1
ð1 pÞ2yðpÞdp, where the weight ð1 pÞ2 indicates a distortion function applied to quantiles yðpÞ; p 2 ½0;1 of the distribution of stochastic in-
come, representing risk aversion (see Andreoli, 2018). Demand for redistribution is given by the optimal tax rate τ* satisfying ∂EUð~y
dÞ
∂τ ¼ 0. This is τ* ¼
πby tion is given by the optimal tax rate ndent representation : ion: e support for redistribution; holdingility E½~yy ð1  Gð~yÞÞ. Given expectations E½~y of
gross income and the Gini index measuring market income risk Gð~yÞ, a rise in generosity of the welfare state rises support for redistribution: ∂τ*= ∂π >
0 and ∂τ*=∂b > 0. The same model predicts that support for redistribution rises with income risk and with inequality for the median voter (expecting
E½~y ¼ yð0:5Þ).
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redistribution scheme should be carefully measured, and that variations within country have an impact on individual perspectives for
redistribution. The position of the individual can also vary along the life-cycle, socio-demographic characteristics, country, time, in-
come, and economic circumstances. Therefore, including a country-year specific measure of inequality (such as the Gini index of net and
gross income) in a regression of individual preferences for redistribution would lead to an imperfect way to account for the position of
the individual within the structure of taxes and transfers.2
We overcome these limitations by using a two-sample strategy, which consists in pairing individual data of preferences for redis-
tribution drawn from the European Social Survey (ESS) with individual-level predictions of exposure to tax-benefit schemes drawn from
the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Our ESS sample includes all the rounds of interviews taken between 2008 and
2016 (five cross-sections), while the EU-SILC sample includes all the yearly rounds (nine cross-sections) fielded between 2009 and 2017.
Taxes and benefits for ESS respondents are predicted from tax-benefit functions parameters estimated from regressions on representative
groups of respondents in EU-SILC, and matched conditionally on country, year and non-linear combinations of disposable income,
number of householdmembers, marital status and labour market characteristics of householdmembers. Identification of the effect of net
benefits exposure on individual preferences for redistribution exploits exogenous variations in tax-benefit eligibility rules across
countries, years, marriage, labour status of household members and household size.
Our baseline results show that treating the individual with positive net benefits, hence identifying a net recipient from redistribution,
yield a significant increase in the probability of supporting redistribution of 1.4%–3% in the preferred specifications. The effect is robust
to a variety of specifications and after adding relevant controls. Among these controls, we include individual demographics and
household disposable income, in order to control for living standards and the main drivers of the tax schedule. We also include country
and time fixed effects, size of the income redistribution system in the country, measures of market income inequality to control for
uncertainty on income sources and hence hold insurance motives as constant, andmeasures of inequality in disposable income alongside
national income growth predictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section contextualizes our contribution within the relevant empirical liter-
ature; Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6
provides the concluding remarks.
2. Related empirical literature
The median voter theorem, applied in the context of income taxation and redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), predicts that
rising income inequality leads to more redistribution. A whole body of empirical studies has investigated its validity. One group of
empirical studies uses macro-level variables at the country or region level that capture inequality and redistribution (e.g. the Gini
coefficient and social expenditures), while another group focusses on individual preferences for redistribution. In the first group, the
effect of inequality on redistribution has not received much significant empirical support. Examples are Rodriguez (1999), Persson and
Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996), Moene and Wallerstein (2003), Lind (2005) and Shelton (2007), although some exceptions are
Milanovic (2000, 2010) and Karabarbounis (2011). The second group of studies focus on the determinants of individual preferences for
redistribution, with some evaluating the role of income inequality on redistributive preferences (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2011;
Yamamura, 2012; Pittau et al., 2013; Kerr, 2014; Olivera, 2015; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018; Dimick et al., 2016).
The literature has taken several directions in the pursuit of enhancing the predictions of the median voter model. One is the role of
perceptions and informational bias, particularly the finding that individual redistributive preferences correlate more strongly with
perceived inequality than actual inequality (e.g. Cruces et al., 2013, Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018, Hauser and Norton, 2017, Kuhn,
2019 and Choi, 2019). Preferences for redistribution are also determined by individual beliefs about distributive justice, particularly by
the source of inequalities.3 Underlying beliefs such as fairness, luck and effort (Karadja et al., 2017) are prominent determinants studied
mostly in the lab and field experimental surveys. Self-interest, other regarding preferences (Dimick et al., 2016, 2018), insurance
motives and social concerns (Durante et al., 2014) are also part of these micro-level mechanisms behind the formation of redistributive
attitudes.
The effects of the economic environment -captured by macro variables- on preferences for redistribution has also received recent
attention: economic recessions experienced at young age (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014); income inequality experienced at young age
(Roth and Wohlfart, 2018); the recent Great Recession (Fisman et al., 2015) and actual public debt (Roth et al., 2020). Culture and
identity emerged as an important driver for redistributive preferences (Shayo, 2009; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Costa-Font and Cowell,
2015; Bisin and Verdier, 2017), as well as immigration perceptions (Alesina et al. 2018, 2019).
The focus of these empirical contributions has been to disentangle the role of different motives, such as concerns for insurance
against income shocks, for fairness in the process of income determination, or positional concerns, on the extent at which income
inequality affects support for redistribution. The same motives may have opposing implications for the way generosity of redistribution2 A number of studies utilize measures of inequality and redistribution at the country level and across periods to account for the effect of inequality
on preferences for redistribution (e.g. Yamamura, 2012; Pittau et al., 2013; Kerr, 2014; Olivera, 2015; Roth and Wohlfart, 2018). However, we
consider that this strategy gives only an approximate perspective about the role of the structure of taxation and benefits in the country on preferences
for redistribution.
3 See for example Piketty (1995), Fong (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Cappelen et al. (2013), Durante et al. (2014) and Schokkaert and
Truyts (2017).
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difference in the extent of inequality before and after redistribution) fail to capture heterogeneity of exposure to benefits and taxes in the
population, which is driven by the distribution of demographics and income, by employment status and by the actual fiscal policy rules.
Exceptions are Sacchi et al. (2020) and Thewissen and Rueda (2019), who explore unemployment risk induced by the extent of
automation in the economy to assess the extent at which welfare state generosity affects support for redistribution, holding income of the
respondents and income inequality in the country as fixed.
Our approach follows this line, and considers explicit measures of taxes and benefits accruing at the individual level, predicted from
EU-SILC individual data using a two-sample strategy. We hence devise measures of generosity of the welfare state at individual level,
looking at both the probability of being a net benefit recipient as well as the extent of net benefits accruing to the individual. These
measures capture in a compact way both the heterogeneity in exposure to welfare state generosity within the same country, depending
on non-linear relations between individual income, demographics, employment status and redistribution policy parameters, as well as
variation in policy rules across countries and time. We assess the effects of variations in generosity at individual level on support for
redistribution, the response variables, within a regression framework. Identification rests on variation across countries and time in fiscal
policy rules, holding demographics and country and time effects as fixed. Our strategy is related to the study by Akay et al. (2012), which
exploits variation in tax rules across time to assess the impact of marginally rising taxation on happiness in Germany.
3. Data
3.1. Sample and variables
We utilize the 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 rounds of ESS. This survey collects information on attitudes, beliefs, values and
behaviour patterns for a nationally representative sample of individuals living in Europe.4 Alongside, we make use of data from EU-SILC
cross-sections fielded between 2009 and 2017 to estimate taxes and benefits (section 3.2 provides details of this matching). The EU-SILC
is the leading survey in the European Union to provide official measures of income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions in a
comparable way across countries and time.
The key question in ESS that measures preferences for redistribution is the following: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with
the statement: the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. The individual provides her opinion ac-
cording to a 5-level Likert scale: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree. The nature of this
variable is ordinal, that is the scale only represents a qualitative value rather than a specific quantitative measure, and therefore, our
baseline estimation strategy always involves ordered probit models.5 This strategy has also been used by Fong (2001), Alesina and La
Ferrara (2005), Yamamura (2012) and Guillaud (2013). To facilitate interpretation, we also report marginal effects of probit models and
regression results including alternative measurements for the dependent variable (looking in particular at the probability of agreeing or
strongly agreeing with the relevant preference for redistribution question).
The generosity of the tax-benefit system is the main treatment variable. In our baseline results, this is captured with a dummy
variable that takes value one if the individual’s household is a net recipient of benefits (i.e. whether received benefits are larger than
paid taxes) and takes value zero otherwise. In additional regressions, we consider other variables capturing the intensity of the tax-
benefit system experienced by the individual, such as the ratio of benefits to taxes.
The control variables at individual level are sex, marital status, educational level, age, age squared and any condition related to
benefit recipient (retired, unemployed and handicapped) and number of members of the household. Educational levels are expressed as
dummy variables for secondary and tertiary education; retirement, unemployed and disability variables are dummy variables as well.
For robustness check, we additionally control for individual self-assessed political view, ranging on a 0–10 points political scale between
left (0) and right (10).6 A dummy variable for left-oriented views takes value one if the respondent chooses four or less points, and takes
value zero otherwise; while another dummy variable for right-oriented views takes value one if the respondent chooses six or more
points, and takes value zero otherwise.
The analysis also includes country and time specific variables measuring income distribution and the size of redistribution. We
compute Gini indices of equivalized market income (pre-tax and pre-transfers) and disposable income (post-tax and post-transfers) with
EU-SILC data. The mean and median of equivalized disposable income and the shares of national income owned by the bottom 10%, top
10% and top 5% of the income distribution are estimated from EU-SILC data on the relevant income year. The variables for country-year
redistribution levels are the ratios of social transfers to GDP and tax revenues to GDP, which are drawn from the World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators (WBDI). We also include the income growth rate (averaged across three subsequent years) from the WBDI.
After dropping observations with missing information in the variables of interest and for those countries and years with no match
between ESS and EU-SILC, we gather a using sample of 150,543 individuals from 29 European countries observed over the period
2008–2016. The sample size reduces further whenwe perform some robustness checks. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1,4 We do not use the 2002–2006 rounds of ESS because the definition of household income (particularly the number and range of income brackets)
is different with respect to other years.
5 As the 1–5 scale has only an ordinal meaning, OLS regressions (used for instance in Alesina and Giuliano, 2011 and Kerr, 2014) may artificially
introduce bias by assuming linearity of responses vis-a-vis the scale.
6 The ESS question is “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where
0 means the left and 10 means the right?“.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of ESS data.
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Main individual variables:
Preferences for redistribution (1–5) 3.886 1.036 1.0 5.0 150,543
1 Strongly disagree (0–1) 0.025 0.155 0.0 1.0 150,543
2 Disagree (0–1) 0.105 0.306 0.0 1.0 150,543
3 Neither agree nor disagree (0–1) 0.139 0.346 0.0 1.0 150,543
4 Agree (0–1) 0.423 0.494 0.0 1.0 150,543
5 Strongly agree (0–1) 0.308 0.462 0.0 1.0 150,543
Taxes (000’s) (ppp) 28.563 66.306 0.0 1277.6 150,543
Benefits (000’s) (ppp) 10.849 19.458 0.0 605.5 150,543
Net benefits (000’s) (ppp) 17.714 64.310 1245.3 571.5 150,543
Receiving positive net benefits (0–1) 0.463 0.499 0.0 1.0 150,543
ben/tax<1 0.526 0.499 0.0 1.0 150,543
ben/tax 2 [1.00,2.00[ 0.066 0.249 0.0 1.0 150,543
ben/tax 2 [2.00,3.00[ 0.038 0.191 0.0 1.0 150,543
ben/tax 2 [3.00, 6.00[ 0.067 0.249 0.0 1.0 150,543
ben/tax > 6.00 0.303 0.459 0.0 1.0 150,543
(Benefits-taxes)/avg taxes in c-y (%) 32.653 256.403 3144.9 5494.7 150,543
Male (0–1) 0.471 0.499 0.0 1.0 150,543
Married (0–1) 0.608 0.488 0.0 1.0 150,543
Household size 2.537 1.331 1.0 15.0 150,543
Primary education (0–1) 0.104 0.305 0.0 1.0 150,543
Secondary education (0–1) 0.604 0.489 0.0 1.0 150,543
Tertiary education (0–1) 0.292 0.455 0.0 1.0 150,543
Age 50.256 17.731 18.0 105.0 150,543
Age^2/100 28.401 18.344 3.2 110.3 150,543
Pensioner (0–1) 0.268 0.443 0.0 1.0 150,543
Unemployed (0–1) 0.058 0.234 0.0 1.0 150,543
Handicapped (0–1) 0.026 0.160 0.0 1.0 150,543
Political view: Left (0–1) 0.327 0.469 0.0 1.0 136,267
Political view: Right (0–1) 0.354 0.478 0.0 1.0 136,267
Variables related with redistributive preferences:
No large diff in incomes to reward talents & effort (0–1) 0.284 0.451 0.0 1.0 54,444
Diff in standard of living should be small (0–1) 0.640 0.480 0.0 1.0 54,526
Social benefits prevent widespread poverty (0–1) 0.605 0.489 0.0 1.0 53,972
Social benefits lead to a more equal society (0–1) 0.507 0.500 0.0 1.0 53,677
Macro-variables:
Social contributions over GDP 0.312 0.130 0.022 0.557 150,543
Tax revenue over GDP 0.204 0.059 0.094 0.461 150,543
Market income mean (000’s) 19.421 11.646 2.220 54.785 150,543
Income growth 1.205 2.383 6.558 12.968 150,543
Gini market income 0.492 0.039 0.401 0.581 150,543
Gini disposable income 0.291 0.034 0.229 0.368 150,543
Bottom 10% income share 3.194 0.645 1.400 4.300 150,543
Top 10% income share 23.102 2.033 19.300 27.700 150,543
Top 5% income share 14.183 1.527 11.100 17.400 150,543
Mean-to-median income ratio 1.137 0.045 1.035 1.246 150,543
F. Andreoli, J. Olivera European Journal of Political Economy 63 (2020) 101880while Table A1, A2 and A3 in the Appendix report the composition of the ESS using sample and descriptive statistics of preferences for
redistribution and tax-benefit generosity across countries and time.
Table 1 reports that, on average, 30.2% and 42.3% of individuals strongly agree or agree, respectively, that “The government should
take measures to reduce differences in income levels”, though there is substantial heterogeneity across countries and years (see Table A2
in the Appendix for details). On average, half of the individuals of the sample belong to households that are net benefit recipients and the
other half are net tax payers. Nevertheless, countries differ markedly. For example, in the whole analysed period, 13% of individuals in
Denmark belong to households that are net benefit recipients, while in Ireland this figure is 72% (see Table A3 for more details).
The extent of inequality in the distribution of disposable income displays heterogeneous patterns across years and countries in our
data. The Gini index of disposable income ranges from 0.20 (Slovenia in 2008) to 0.35 (Latvia in 2009). The other macro variables also
display important differences across countries and years. For example, the top 10% and 5% income share span from 19% to 29% and
from 11% to 19%, respectively, and the mean-to-median ratio varies between 1.04 and 1.25. The income growth rate over the period of
interest is 1.2% on average, albeit the data display substantial variability. A different measure of inequality is the Gini index of market
income, which captures riskiness in the market income distribution. This index ranges between 0.40 and 0.58 in our sample, reflecting
the sharp increase in inequality experienced by many of the countries we consider over the Great Recession. The redistribution system
reduces inequality by about one third (i.e., by comparing the Gini indices of market and disposable income). The extent of this effect
depends on the size of the redistribution system, which is captured by the country-year specific share of average income that is collected
as social contribution or tax revenue.5
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Information about individual exposure to tax-benefit rules has to be imputed from data other than ESS, which only reports disposable
income at household level, alongside demographics. We use an indirect statistical matching method based on a two-sample strategy to
link characteristics of taxpayers’ households provided in ESS to parametric estimates of the tax and benefit scheme of a particular
country and year recovered from EU-SILC. Information on income is supplemented with characteristics of the household and of its
components, along with information about labour market attachment of workers and their earnings. The reference period for incomes,
taxes and benefits used in EU-SILC is the year prior to fieldwork. Therefore, the ESS survey fielded in a particular year must be paired
with the EU-SILC cross-section of the following year. Table A4 in the Appendix provides summary statistics by country of the benefits
and taxes distribution for the EU-SILC using sample (pooling 856,099 observations).
The matching procedure unfolds as follows. First, we obtain estimates from EU-SILC of specific parameters that capture the tax-
benefit scheme of each country and year and reveal the exposure of individuals to taxes and benefits conditional on key observables
that determine the link between gross and disposable income (labour and marital status in the household and household size). Oper-
ationally, we do so in a reduced form setting by regressing separately the amount of taxes paid and benefits received by each household
on non-linear combinations of disposable household income brackets, number of household members, marital status and labour market
characteristics of household members (full- or part-time work, unemployed, studying, pensioner, handicapped and other). The esti-
mating models for taxes (taxi) and benefits (beni) are7:
yi ¼ γ0 þ
X
d
yiðdÞ *

γ0ðdÞþ
X
γ1sðdÞXi þ γ2ðdÞMi þ γ3ðdÞSi

þ εi; (1)
where yi ¼ ftaxi; benig for a given country and year. The parameters of interest, γðdÞ, are estimated regressing taxes and benefits
accruing at the household level on a vector of characteristics of the household Xi, including dummy variables indicating whether any
member of the household is i) working full-time; ii) working part-time; iii) a pensioner or is unemployed; iv) self-employed; v) a student;
vi) handicapped; vii) other. The covariateMi takes value one if any member of the household is married and zero otherwise, a relevant
information for assignment of benefits and for taxation in those countries with a joint filing system. Si indicates the number of members
in the household. All these variables are interacted with indicators yiðdÞ of 10 income brackets (d¼1,…,10) as defined by the deciles of
the household disposable income distribution in the corresponding country and year. Thereby, parameters γðdÞ vary along character-
istics of the household and the income decile d that the household belongs to. We use household disposable income brackets instead of
nominal values because ESS only reports information about disposable income at household level in brackets corresponding to the
country-year income distribution deciles. To guarantee statistical match of EU-SILC estimates on ESS, we use the same definition of
income brackets reported in ESS. Although this simplification induces bias in estimating tax-benefit rules parameters, the interactions
between income brackets and household characteristics introduced in equation (1) help us to control for it.
Finally, the regression parameters estimated in EU-SILC are assigned to the ESS respondents by identifying the same household type
the respondent belongs to. This means that the pairing is conditional on non-linear combinations of income, household size, marriage
and labour status of household members, which allow us to predict taxes and benefits for each individual in ESS, denoteddtaxi anddbeni.
Once taxes and benefits are predicted for each individual in ESS, we construct measures of generosity of the tax-benefit rule, our main
treatment variable, based on the empirical indexdbenidtaxi.
The pairing of EU-SILC and ESS at individual level performs correctly. Figure 1 shows that the original distributions (kernel) of
observed net benefits, taxes and net benefits from raw data in EU-SILC almost entirely overlap the distributions estimated with the
matched data simulated in ESS.8 On average, we do not observe relevant discrepancies between these distributions in the overall sample
or when comparison are broken down by country (see Fig. A1 in the appendix).
4. Empirical strategy
The empirical literature on preferences for redistribution routinely adopts multiscale questions eliciting individual redistributive
preferences such as those reported in ESS. We use ordered probit regressions as in Fong (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005),
Yamamura (2012) and Guillaud (2013) to analyze the conditional effects of the treatments of interest. The estimating equation is:
PR*i;c;t ¼ αc þ δt þ βXc;t þ γZi;c;t þ θTi;c;t þ εi;c;t (2)
The subscripts i, c and t stand for individual, country and time, respectively. PR*i;c;t is a latent variable measuring the intensity of
preferences for redistribution of individual i. In the data, we only observe a variable that takes values from 1 to 5 in the Likert scale
where a higher number implies more support for redistribution as follows:7 We implement Tobit regressions in order to take into account the censoring feature of taxes and benefits. A non-negligible number of households
have zero benefits or pay zero taxes.
8 The matched ESS data clearly predict less volatility than the raw data from EU-SILC, being ESS data model-based predictions that cannot
incorporate additional variability in the data. Nonetheless, the flexible specification of the estimating models allows to capture non-linearities in
relevant covariates and in policy features.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of benefits and taxes in ESS and EU-SILC.
F. Andreoli, J. Olivera European Journal of Political Economy 63 (2020) 101880PRi;c;t ¼ j if ρj1  PR*i;c;t < ρj (3)Where ρj (j ¼ 1,…,5) are cut-off points to be estimated and it is assumed that ρ0 ¼ ∞ and ρ5 ¼ þ∞. The main effect of interest is β,
which sign and significance allow to meaningfully assess the implications of the treatment variables on preferences for redistribution. In
our results, we also report marginal effects of probit regressions in order to facilitate interpretation. These regressions use the same
specification as equation (2) to predict Pr½PRi;c;t  4, i.e. the probability that ESS respondents agree or strongly agree that the gov-
ernment should takemeasures to reduce differences in income levels. Themarginal effects from the probit regressions provide ameasure
of the effect of the relevant treatment on the probability of supporting redistribution. Given the distribution of responses (with more than7
Fig. 2. Identification strategy. Note: countries are grouped by the extent of benefit/taxes ratio in 2008–2009. Preferences for redistribution are
averages by year and country group. Polynomial and OLS fitted lines are based on averaged data.
F. Andreoli, J. Olivera European Journal of Political Economy 63 (2020) 10188070% of sample supporting redistribution), this effect is also informative on the marginal effect of the treatment on the level of support for
redistribution from equation model 5.
Parameters αc and δt control for country and year fixed effects, which account for country characteristics and general trends over
time,9 while εi;c;t is the error term. The vector Xc;t includes country and year specific variables related to income distribution. First, the
distribution of pre-tax income in the country affects both the degree of redistribution in force in the country (size and generosity) and is
potentially correlated with individual attitudes towards redistribution. To account for this spurious correlation, we consider information
about the country disposable income distribution, including the mean, median, and measures of inequality such as the income shares
held by the richest 10% and 5% of the population, as well as by the bottom 10%. Second, we control for the size of redistribution in the
country by holding the share of tax revenues and social contribution over income as fixed. Third, Xc;t also include controls for market
income inequality, representing the extent of income uncertainty faced by the individuals. Fourth, we control for the extent of income
growth (on average) to account for the implications of the POUM hypothesis on preferences for redistribution10. The vector Zi;c;t collects
information on socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents: sex, marital status, education, age and any condition related to the
individual being a benefit recipient (retired, unemployed and handicapped). The variables in Ti;c;t represent the treatment indicators for
exposure of the individual’s household to the tax-benefit schedule. We consider two sets of indicators, defining alternative specifications
of the estimating model. First, we consider whether the individual receives positive benefits net of taxes (¼1 ifdbeni=dtaxi > 1). Second,
we consider a variety of indicators for the generosity of the benefit-tax system, particularly the intensity of the benefit-to-tax ratio. In all
cases, we always control for the size of the benefit net of taxes accruing to the individual’s household.
The identification of the effect of individual exposure to tax-benefit on redistributive preferences rests on heterogeneity in redis-
tribution policies across countries and years, holding fixed the individual characteristics that enter into the net benefit equations as well
as the features of the income distribution. Figure 2 hints on the identifying information exploited in the empirical analysis. It plots
average levels of preferences for redistribution in each ESS round for two groups of countries. The group of low (resp. high) ben/tax
countries gathers the bottom (top) half of countries ranked by the proportion of households receiving benefits that are at least double as
much larger than taxes paid over the period 2008–2010. On the same figure, we report a polynomial fit across these points. Time fixed
effects capture trends over time in preferences for redistribution. Country fixed effects capture differences in levels of preferences for
redistribution across the two groups of countries. Identification rests on differences in trends among these two groups of countries over
time, being defined by the extent of generosity of the tax and benefit system. The fitted lines estimated with OLS, plotted in the graph,
show that the group of high-generosity countries display a steeper (increasing) trend in preferences for redistribution compared to the
other group of countries. The difference between the two trends identifies the effect of interest. A reduced form regression of country-
year averages of preferences for redistribution11 reveals that an increase in the probability of being a high-generosity country rises the
probability of supporting redistribution by 4.1% (statistically significant at 5%), which is close to the range of our preferred estimates
based on micro-data. The effect might be explained either by the way high and low ben/tax countries react to implications of the Great
Recession, or by the implications of the recession for the distribution of income (and then generosity of the tax-benefit system).9 The inclusion of country dummies is common practice in order to control for unobserved characteristics at the country level that can be related
with individual preferences for redistribution. Karabarbounis (2011), for instance, cite legal origins, political institutions, persistent cultural char-
acteristics, ethnic fragmentation, prospects of upward mobility, and social beliefs about fairness.
10 See Cojocaru (2014) for an empirical test of the POUM hypothesis.
11 This regression is run over inequality indicators, year and group fixed effects, and an indicator for generosity of the redistribution system
interacted with a post-2012 indicator.
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Table 2
Linear models for preferences for redistribution.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx
Receiving posit. net ben. 0.0294**
(0.0144)
0.0140**
(0.0063)
0.0311**
(0.0143)
0.0144**
(0.0064)
0.0306**
(0.0138)
0.0137**
(0.0060)
0.0335**
(0.0153)
0.0145**
(0.0066)
0.0124
(0.0188)
0.0073
(0.0084)
Social contrib. over GDP 0.9142
(1.2307)
0.3039
(0.4855)
0.4900
(1.4066)
0.0600
(0.4734)
0.4853
(1.5595)
0.0324
(0.4883)
0.4664
(1.5567)
0.0270
(0.4882)
Tax revenue over GDP 1.3809*
(0.7604)
0.5198**
(0.2631)
1.2928
(0.7954)
0.4849*
(0.2656)
1.1510
(0.8173)
0.4802*
(0.2665)
1.1383
(0.8180)
0.4751*
(0.2664)
Market income mean (000’s) 0.0024
(0.0068)
0.0016
(0.0023)
0.0046
(0.0072)
0.0015
(0.0023)
0.0056
(0.0074)
0.0019
(0.0023)
0.0055
(0.0074)
0.0018
(0.0023)
Income growth 0.0038
(0.0089)
0.0034
(0.0026)
0.0030
(0.0098)
0.0038
(0.0028)
0.0031
(0.0097)
0.0038
(0.0028)
Gini market income 0.3077
(1.8899)
0.2371
(0.5326)
0.4679
(2.0207)
0.2900
(0.5373)
0.4476
(2.0117)
0.2950
(0.5354)
Gini disposable income 2.6383
(3.4096)
0.9076
(1.3202)
2.3053
(3.3895)
0.7890
(1.2519)
2.3177
(3.3921)
0.7930
(1.2530)
Bottom 10% income share 0.0002
(0.0724)
0.0111
(0.0223)
0.0145
(0.0740)
0.0181
(0.0216)
0.0153
(0.0737)
0.0182
(0.0216)
Top 10% income share 0.1356
(0.1095)
0.0496
(0.0358)
0.1316
(0.1071)
0.0462
(0.0352)
0.1296
(0.1071)
0.0456
(0.0353)
Top 5% income share 0.1313
(0.1110)
0.0520
(0.0347)
0.1273
(0.1126)
0.0506
(0.0356)
0.1254
(0.1124)
0.0500
(0.0356)
Left 0.2714***
(0.0256)
0.0928***
(0.0085)
0.2903***
(0.0291)
0.0984***
(0.0107)
Right 0.2444***
(0.0270)
0.0776***
(0.0084)
0.2881***
(0.0271)
0.0895***
(0.0089)
Left*I(net benefit>0) 0.0434*
(0.0254)
0.0145
(0.0099)
Right*I(net benefit>0) 0.1013***
(0.0215)
0.0290***
(0.0076)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income sources Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 150,543 150,543 150,543 150,543 150,543 150,543 136,267 136,267 136,267 136,267
Note: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. The models 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 show the coefficients of ordered probit regressions where the dependent variable is ordinal in 5 levels from strongly disagree to strongly
agree with respect to the statement “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. The models 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 show the marginal effects of probit regressions where the
dependent variable takes value one if the individuals agree or strongly agree with the previous statement, and takes value zero otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered by
country.
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Table 3
Alternative measures of attitudes towards redistribution.
Variable
No large diff in incomes to
reward talents & effort
For a fair society, diff in
standard of living should be
small
Social benefits prevent
widespread poverty
Social benefits lead to a more
equal society
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx
Receiving posit. net ben. 0.0047
(0.0140)
0.0030
(0.0071)
0.0207
(0.0156)
0.0031
(0.0087)
0.0583***
(0.0154)
0.0263***
(0.0078)
0.0116
(0.0131)
0.0027
(0.0071)
Social contrib. over GDP 6.9695***
(0.2502)
3.0027***
(0.0893)
8.8938***
(0.2890)
3.7431***
(0.0814)
9.0741***
(0.2403)
3.1063***
(0.1100)
10.4212***
(0.3972)
4.5149***
(0.1105)
Tax revenue over GDP 0.7483
(0.6744)
0.8032***
(0.2066)
2.3421***
(0.3570)
0.6864***
(0.1441)
1.7357***
(0.3232)
0.1766
(0.1370)
1.1233*
(0.5972)
1.0542***
(0.1743)
Market inc. mean (000’s) 0.0292***
(0.0077)
0.0091***
(0.0025)
0.0176***
(0.0035)
0.0021
(0.0014)
0.0536***
(0.0040)
0.0171***
(0.0015)
0.0733***
(0.0075)
0.0231***
(0.0020)
Income growth 0.0273***
(0.0075)
0.0117***
(0.0024)
0.0659***
(0.0042)
0.0296***
(0.0014)
0.0284***
(0.0039)
0.0041***
(0.0014)
0.0528***
(0.0080)
0.0151***
(0.0019)
Gini market income 5.9266***
(0.9703)
2.1727***
(0.3203)
3.9737***
(0.5136)
1.4637***
(0.2242)
5.9566***
(0.5173)
3.2947***
(0.2473)
11.1431***
(0.8521)
4.5951***
(0.2529)
Gini disposable income 8.0763***
(0.8395)
5.4540***
(0.2624)
24.9860***
(0.7814)
8.9117***
(0.1513)
12.6836***
(0.4807)
7.6531***
(0.1704)
9.4917***
(0.9174)
6.6618***
(0.2164)
Bottom 10% inc. share 0.6225***
(0.0304)
0.3477***
(0.0092)
0.8406***
(0.0216)
0.4443***
(0.0076)
0.6058***
(0.0184)
0.1752***
(0.0065)
0.4707***
(0.0238)
0.1674***
(0.0059)
Top 10% inc. share 0.0491
(0.0537)
0.0658***
(0.0169)
0.3801***
(0.0273)
0.1643***
(0.0085)
0.5197***
(0.0267)
0.2386***
(0.0094)
0.6750***
(0.0538)
0.2988***
(0.0124)
N 54,444 54,444 54,881 54,526 54,807 53,972 54,761 53,677
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Specifications are as in models 5 and 6 of Table 2; yet, the gini of disposable income is rule out due to high
autocorrelation. For model 1, the dependent variable is a 5-level Likert scale with respect to the statement “Large differences in income are acceptable
to reward talents and efforts”. For model 2, the dependent variable takes value one if the individual disagrees or strongly disagrees with the previous
statement, and takes value zero otherwise. For model 3, the dependent variable is a 5-level Likert scale with respect to the statement “For a fair society,
differences in standard of living should be small”. For model 4, the dependent variable takes value one if the individual disagrees or strongly disagrees
with the previous statement, and takes value zero otherwise. For model 5, the dependent variable is a 5-level Likert scale with respect to the statement
“Social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty”. For model 6, the dependent variable takes value one if the individual disagrees or strongly
disagrees with the previous statement, and takes value zero otherwise. For model 7, the dependent variable is a 5-level Likert scale with respect to the
statement “Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society”. For model 8, the dependent variable takes value one if the individual disagrees or
strongly disagrees with the previous statement, and takes value zero otherwise. The estimates are based on round 4 (2008) and 8 (2016) of ESS. All
regressions control for demographics, income sources and country and year FE.
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Models 1 and 2 of Table 2 report the results from regressions of preferences for redistribution on individual characteristics and on
exposure to the actual redistribution, holding individual characteristics such as education, sex, age and income as fixed, and including
country and time fixed effects. The first column shows the coefficient of an ordered probit regression using the 5-level Likert scale for the
dependent variable of preferences for redistribution, while the second column shows the marginal effect of a probit equation, where the
dependent variable takes value one if the individual agrees or strongly agrees with the statement about supporting redistribution, and
takes value zero otherwise. We find that holding positive net benefits rises preferences for redistribution by about 1.4% (model 2).
Among the individual correlates, age is strongly correlated with the source of income and exposure to income shocks. We include
additional controls for the amount of social benefits entitled to the individual and for the interaction with the treatment indicator. In this
way, we produce comparable effects of a rise in social benefits conditional on the extent of actual net benefits.
In Models 3 to 6 of Table 2 we control for potential cofounders related to differences in the size of income inequality and redis-
tribution. Estimates from these models account for a variety of features of the income distribution in a given country-year, alongside
information about the size of the redistribution system. Compared to estimates in model 1 and 2, the effects of interest remain significant
and their magnitudes only change marginally after introducing further controls (it is about 1.4%).
Our preferred specification is that of models 5 and 6, where the features of the country-year income distribution are also controlled
for. Particularly, the inclusion of the Gini index of market income and income growth control for the exposure to uncertainty in future
income and the POUM hypothesis. We find that increasing exposure to generosity of the tax-benefit system rises support for redistri-
bution by 1.37%, significant at standard confidence levels. In Table A6 in the Appendix (in model 1) we have computed the marginal
effects of receiving positive net benefits on the probability of reporting each of the five categories of the relevant scale. We find that the
treatment generates a compounded increase in the probability of supporting redistribution (items 4 and 5) of 1.48%, whereas the effect
reduces the probability of not supporting redistributions (items 1 to 3).
In Models 7 and 8 of Table 2 we control for individual political attitudes, i.e. whether the person self-assess towards left-wing or
right-wing political attitudes. Controlling for political attitudes is relevant for our identification strategy, since the political opinion
delimits the voting attitudes across countries and time and hence shapes the actual redistribution system. Model 8 reports the effect of10
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close to baseline estimates. Political views have the expected relationship with redistributive preferences (see for instance Bernasconi,
2006); individuals with left-wing views tend to be in favour of redistribution while individuals with right-wing views tend to be against.
Model 9 and 10 extend the previous specifications by introducing interactions between the generosity of the tax-benefits system and
political attitudes. We do not detect evidence of direct effects of generosity of the tax-benefit system on redistributive preferences by
political views. Nonetheless, we find a statistically significant relationship between political attitude and being net benefit receiver.
Particularly, we observe that right-oriented individuals receiving positive net benefits increase their support for redistribution (models 9
and 10) and that left leaning individuals receiving positive net benefits reduce their support for redistribution (only in model 9).
Interestingly, this implies that even right-oriented individuals may be in favour of redistribution if they are exposed to enough ad-
vantageous redistribution.
Table 3 extends our results with related concepts about preferences for redistribution. We make use of round 4 (2008) and round 8
(2016) of ESS –specifically the thematic ESS’s module on welfare attitudes– to recover these concepts as new dependent variables. As
with our key variable about preferences for redistribution, the individuals express their agreement in a 5-level Likert scale to four
different statements. These are “Large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts” (models 1–2); “For fair society,
differences in standard of living should be small” (models 3–4); “Social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty” (models 5–6);
and “Social benefits/services lead to amore equal society” (models 7–8). The levels of agreement are recorded in such a way that a larger
level implies more support or taste for equality and redistribution and believing that inequality should be reduced.12 In this way, we
expect a positive correlation between preferences for redistribution and these alternative measures. Each of these variables represents
one potential motive for demanding for redistribution. Estimates in Table 3 reveal that the generosity of the welfare state positively
affects the belief that social benefits and services prevent widespread poverty (models 5 and 6), but not the other variables. This result
implies that treated individuals do believe that the welfare state can help mitigating generalized poverty, which may lend support to the
idea that other-regarding preferences play a role on preferences for redistribution (Dimick et al., 2016, 2018).
Table 4 reports estimates from separate models based on our preferred specification. In models 1–4, we use our baseline specification
about preferences for redistribution. In the table, we report for each panel I-VI only the coefficients of the relevant treatment variable,
capturing the intensity of the tax system generosity on support for redistribution. Panel I reports the effect of being a net benefit recipient
on preferences for redistribution (as used in previous tables), capturing the extensive margins of redistribution. Panel II utilizes the
levels of taxes and benefits jointly, where treatments are reported in thousands PPP euros. Rising benefits (taxes) holding taxes (benefits)
fixed rises (decreases) support for redistribution, albeit the effect is insignificant across specifications. We find a similar pattern when
looking directly at net benefits (panel III), normalized by the sample standard deviation. Cross-country variation in these monetary
measures may be affected by the lack of a common scale for the size of the redistribution system. In the remaining panels, we consider
relative measures of intensity of net benefits.
Panel IV of Table 4 reports instead a positional treatment, measuring the percentile rank occupied by each individual in her own
country-period distribution of net benefits. We interpret the treatment as the effect of rising by one percentile in this scale, and we
include a quadratic term to capture non-linearities. Rising positions by 10 percentage points rises the probability of supporting redis-
tribution by about 0.7% (the quadratic term is relatively small compared to the size of coefficients), the effect being close to 0.017 on the
scale estimated by the ordered probit model.
Panel V includes four levels of the benefit-to-tax ratio experienced by the individual’s household.13 These indicators break down the
positive net benefits treatment of panel I into different categories, ranging from situations where benefits are smaller than double the
amount of taxes but their difference is positive (i.e. ben/tax 2 [1.00,2.00[), up to more extreme values. Our preferred specifications show
that the recorded effects are of the size 0.8%–1.2% in model 4, and about 0.03 in model 3, albeit only coefficients associated to ben/tax 2
[1.00,2.00[ yield a significant effect on support for redistribution.
Lastly, Panel VI reports the coefficients associated with rising net benefits, while net benefits are normalized across countries by the
size of the tax base, so that net benefits are reported as a percent of this fraction (the size of the tax based is used as a further control in
the model). To simplify readings of the table, we report the effect of a standard deviation increase in this variable. This measure of
generosity makes net benefit relative to the size of redistribution in a given country and year. The effect of rising relative net benefits by
one standard deviation is always significant at 5% level and amounts to rising support to redistribution by about 1% in model 4, which
corresponds to an effect of about 0.034 along the scale measuring the intensity of support for redistribution.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, we check how sensitive our results are to changes in the way we construct the dependent variable.
Model 5 uses a recoded Likert scale with three categories: strongly disagree, disagree, and agree or strongly agree (the category ‘neither
agree nor disagree’ is left out). Model 6 uses a dependent variable that takes value one if the individual agrees or strongly agrees with the
statement about preferences for redistribution, and takes value zero if she disagrees or strongly disagrees (the category ‘neither agree nor
disagree’ is left out). For what concerns the intensive margins of treatment, the effects we estimate using this scale are robust and in the
range of those reported in models 3 and 4, respectively. The effect is non-significant for the measures of intensity of benefits in panel V12 For the probit regressions, the dependent variable of model 2 takes value one if the individual disagrees or strongly disagrees that large dif-
ferences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts, and takes value zero otherwise. In model 4, it takes value one if the individual agrees
or strongly agrees that for fair society, differences in standard of living should be small, and takes value zero otherwise. In model 6, it takes value 1 if
the individual agrees or strongly agrees that social benefits and services prevent widespread poverty, and takes value zero otherwise. In model 8, it
takes value 1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees that social benefits and services lead to a more equal society, and takes value zero otherwise.
13 The reference category for these indicators is whether the benefit-to-tax ratio is smaller than 1.0, that is, net benefits are negative.
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Table 4
Generosity of the tax benefit system and attitudes towards redistribution.
Regression Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx oprobit coeff probit dy/dx
I. Receiving posit. net ben. 0.0294**
(0.0144)
0.0140**
(0.0063)
0.0306**
(0.0138)
0.0137**
(0.0060)
0.0079
(0.0222)
0.0066
(0.0067)
II. Benefits (in ‘000) 0.0006**
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0006**
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0003
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0001)
Taxes (in ‘000) 0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0000
(0.0000)
III. Net benefits (in SD units) 0.0026
(0.0075)
0.0005
(0.0024)
0.0036
(0.0088)
0.0011
(0.0027)
0.0040
(0.0099)
0.0011
(0.0022)
IV. Net benefits pct (by c-y) 0.0017*
(0.0009)
0.0007***
(0.0003)
0.0017*
(0.0009)
0.0007***
(0.0003)
0.0029***
(0.0009)
0.0006***
(0.0002)
Net benefits pct 2 (by c-y) 0.0000*
(0.0000)
0.0000**
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000**
(0.0000)
0.0000***
(0.0000)
0.0000***
(0.0000)
V. ben/tax 2 [1.00,2.00[ 0.0310*
(0.0175)
0.0062
(0.0049)
0.0343**
(0.0168)
0.0079*
(0.0047)
0.0237
(0.0200)
0.0061
(0.0043)
ben/tax 2 [2.00,3.00[ 0.0316
(0.0276)
0.0116
(0.0108)
0.0330
(0.0270)
0.0122
(0.0106)
0.0192
(0.0401)
0.0063
(0.0091)
ben/tax 2 [3.00, 6.00[ 0.0071
(0.0255)
0.0016
(0.0089)
0.0079
(0.0245)
0.0020
(0.0085)
0.0472
(0.0355)
0.0083
(0.0075)
ben/tax > 6.00 0.0116
(0.0204)
0.0006
(0.0077)
0.0118
(0.0205)
0.0002
(0.0077)
0.0156
(0.0327)
0.0041
(0.0071)
VI. Net benefit/taxes (in SD units) 0.0343***
(0.0122)
0.0101***
(0.0036)
0.0341***
(0.0124)
0.0101***
(0.0036)
0.0308*
(0.0167)
0.0062*
(0.0036)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income sources Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market income inequalities No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social contributions and tax revenues No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 150,543 150,543 150,543 150,543 129,582 129,582
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Each panel reports the key coefficients about the generosity of the tax-benefit system of a separate regression.
Coefficients of controls are not reported. Models 1 and 3 show the coefficients of ordered probit regressions where the dependent variable is ordinal in
five levels (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree). The models 2 and 4 show the marginal effects of probit regressions where the dependent variable
takes value one if the individual agrees or strongly agrees with the statement about preferences for redistribution (categories 4 and 5), and takes value
zero otherwise. The model 5 shows the coefficients of an ordered probit model with four categories: strongly disagree, disagree, and agree and strongly
agree. The model 6 shows the marginal effects of a probit regression where the dependent variable takes value one if the individual agrees or strongly
agrees with supporting redistribution, and takes value zero if she disagrees or strongly disagrees. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and
clustered by country.
F. Andreoli, J. Olivera European Journal of Political Economy 63 (2020) 101880(albeit the size and sign coincide), however, the effects for treatments in panels IV and VI in model 5 and 6 are significant and
remarkably similar to those obtained for specifications 3 and 4. While dropping the Likert scale’s category 3 from the analysis seems not
to affect the implications of measures of intensity of net benefits on support to redistribution, we find that the extensive margins are
affected. Model 6 shows that receiving positive net benefits has an effect of rising support for redistribution by about 0.6%, the effect
being half the size of the coefficient estimated in model 4 and statistically insignificant. While reduced significance is reconciled with
smaller sample size in models 5 and 6, lower estimated effects for the extensive margins of redistribution may be a consequence of
dropping a category of response which is significantly and negatively affected by rising the probability of receiving positive net benefits.
As Table A6’s model 1 shows, receiving positive net benefits significantly reduces by about 0.5% the probability of disagreeing, strongly
disagreeing or neither agreeing or disagreeing with the ESS question measuring support for redistribution. The same pattern is also
registered for other indicators for the intensive margins of treatment, reported in columns 2, 3 and 4 of the table.
6. Concluding remarks
In this study, we document empirically that tax and benefit schemes have a significant independent effect on preferences for
redistribution, even after accounting for many demographics and inequality indices. To obtain these effects, we have used a two-sample
strategy to estimate individual level exposure to taxes and benefits on ESS, using EU-SILC data as a benchmark. By expanding the ESS
dataset, we are able to fully account for the way redistribution policies interact with individual level attributes to generate the treatment
of interest.12
F. Andreoli, J. Olivera European Journal of Political Economy 63 (2020) 101880This paper exploits time and geographic variation in tax-benefit rules to provide robust evidence that rising generosity of the welfare
state rises support for redistribution, holding income risk, income levels, income growth and country-time specific effects as fixed.
Overall, we find that rising the probability of being a net benefit holder rises support for redistribution by about 1.4% in the preferred
specification (model 4 in Table 2), the effect being mostly related to material poverty considerations (Table 3). The level of individual
benefits vis-a-vis taxes, relative to the country-year size of redistribution, are also positively and significantly associated with support for
redistribution. Rising the position in the net benefit distribution, or doubling the benefits-to-taxes ratio, or increasing net benefits
relative to national fiscal revenues rises support for redistribution by about 1.0%. Effects estimated with non-linear models are close to
those obtained by fitting linear (probability) models through OLS.14
Effects on the outcome level are also of interest. Compared to a sample average of 3.88 points (on the Likert scale), receiving positive
net benefits rises outcome responses by 0.045 points.15 Concerning relative measures of net benefit generosity, we find that the
percentile ranking on the net benefit distribution yields positive but small effects on the support for redistribution scale, while rising net
benefits or receiving benefits that are double as much as taxes is associated with an increase in the level of support for redistribution of
0.03 points. These effects, obtained with the preferred specification using non-linear models, coincide with point estimates from OLS
regressions on the level of support for redistribution.
Models incorporating insurance motives, positional concerns and preferences for fairness predict ambiguous effects of rising welfare
state generosity on support for redistribution. This paper contributes to this literature with evidence from micro data, providing robust
indication that the effects of interest are positive and significant.
The results contribute to an ongoing debate, initiated with the Meltzer and Richard (1981) political economy model, about the role
of changes in inequality on support for redistribution. The presence of redistribution, and the generosity of the welfare state, provide
strong incentives for working decisions, for wealth accumulation and, more broadly, for human capital acquisition. Redistribution
policy hence affects pre-fisc market income inequality through different channels. Rising generosity of the welfare state may create
disincentives on the extensive margins of labour supply for low-income earners and increase income polarization at the top of the
income distribution, widening market income inequalities. Holding market inequality and individual income as fixed, we show that
differential exposure to taxes and benefits across the population has an impact on support for redistribution, which is comparable to that
of rising by 3–4 points the Gini inequality index of market and disposable income (as reported in the literature using ESS or other
sources, see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Olivera, 2015).
This paper motivates that generosity of the welfare system should be accounted for in the analysis of preferences for redistribution,
and it shows how do it. Our results also highlight the importance of looking at taxes and benefits altogether in evaluating the effects of
the welfare state expansion. Results are consistent with predictions from a model a la Alesina and Angeletos (2005) where the society
holds a preference for fairness, whereas the outcome distribution is driven by luck. Integrating suchmodels with benefits alongside taxes
would shed light on the channels driving support for redistribution. Our results show that poverty reduction motivations are
dominating.
Finally, we stress that this paper only considers in-cash benefits accruing to the survey respondent’s family, whereas in modern
welfare states a large share of transfers is supplied in kind thorugh public goods provision, such as free education. The extent at which
universal in-kind trasnfers are redistributive depends on whether richer households prefer to sort into private provision while financing
public provision with taxes (see Andreoli et al., 2018). Modelling and estimating the implications of in-kind transfers on support for
redistribution is a pending task for future research.Declaration of competing interest
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Table A1
Available observations in less restrictive model specification
Country Round 2008 Round 2010 Round 2012 Round 2014 Round 2016 Total14Austria 1373 1344 1282 1438 5437
Belgium 1476 1379 1595 1509 1604 7563
Bulgaria 1684 1902 1853 5439
Croatia 979 1094 2073
Cyprus 923 652 826 2401
Czech Re 1326 1562 1250 1386 1525 7049
Denmark 1322 1296 1109 1258 4985
Estonia 1257 1413 1795 1679 1858 8002
Finland 1932 1650 1959 1876 1751 9168
France 1784 1522 1726 1698 1808 8538
Germany 2167 2297 2406 2603 2395 11,868
Greece 1139 1712 2851
Hungary 1072 1171 1247 1122 4612
Iceland 550 550
Ireland 1501 1671 1800 4972
Italy 479 479
Latvia 1358 1358
Lithuania 1479 1068 1453 1522 5522
Netherlands 1504 1443 1529 1683 1453 7612
Norway 1419 1406 1478 1287 5590
Poland 1190 1209 1359 1108 1168 6034
Portugal 894 1045 896 952 3787
Romania 1355 1355
Slovakia 1149 897 1171 3217
Slovenia 920 962 861 925 1045 4713
Spain 1494 1411 1458 1388 5751
Sweden 1633 1322 1613 1574 1374 7516
Switzerland 1314 1159 1156 1193 4822
UK 1934 1812 1684 1849 7279
Total 37,578 34,399 31,453 29,694 17,419 150,543
Table A2
Preferences for redistribution (% of responses on 1-5 scale), 2008–2016
Country Round 2008 Round 2010 Round 2012 Round 2014 Round 2016
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Austria 6.3 15.9 16.1 33.1 28.6 5.2 6.3 17.9 36.8 33.9 2.0 4.8 10.1 43.7 39.5 2.3 6.3 13.2 49.5 28.7
Belgium 2.5 13.0 13.0 44.6 26.9 2.3 12.0 14.2 44.0 27.4 3.5 11.3 13.5 45.5 26.2 3.6 11.4 12.5 43.3 29.1 2.2 12.0 12.5 44.8 28.4
Bulgaria 3.9 7.4 9.6 31.5 47.6 2.4 3.0 6.5 25.7 62.5 1.9 2.5 5.9 35.0 54.6
Croatia 1.6 5.0 14.3 53.2 25.8 0.7 4.2 9.6 49.8 35.6
Cyprus 1.5 9.9 9.5 46.0 33.0 0.9 3.5 7.1 46.9 41.6 1.9 5.8 9.2 42.0 41.0
Czech Rep 8.6 13.3 20.4 29.6 28.1 4.0 10.6 19.6 31.8 34.0 3.4 10.7 19.2 35.3 31.4 5.7 13.0 22.2 35.1 24.0 7.6 20.1 23.1 36.2 13.0
Denmark 6.5 30.1 21.2 30.4 11.8 7.4 32.8 21.7 28.5 9.6 8.4 31.7 21.6 30.1 8.3 9.9 29.6 23.4 28.0 9.1
Estonia 2.2 11.1 17.4 44.2 25.1 1.1 10.0 13.0 49.5 26.4 1.4 6.9 11.5 43.2 37.1 1.4 7.7 12.1 44.4 34.4 1.4 9.4 19.7 48.3 21.2
Finland 1.8 7.7 14.4 42.0 34.2 1.5 8.1 14.2 44.3 32.0 1.4 7.8 15.7 42.4 32.7 2.2 8.7 15.0 39.8 34.2 1.4 8.1 17.5 44.0 29.1
France 3.5 7.2 10.3 37.0 41.9 2.8 7.4 8.9 38.7 42.3 5.2 8.3 11.7 36.7 38.1 6.5 9.5 13.3 36.1 34.6 4.1 9.3 11.9 38.6 36.0
Germany 2.5 14.1 14.5 46.1 22.8 3.2 12.5 12.5 44.1 27.7 1.2 10.5 11.7 46.3 30.3 1.5 13.0 12.3 48.3 24.9 1.5 11.3 12.3 46.7 28.2
Greece 0.4 1.1 6.1 43.5 48.9 2.3 6.7 7.6 30.8 52.6
Hungary 1.2 3.7 10.0 33.5 51.6 0.8 2.0 7.9 31.2 58.1 1.5 3.5 10.4 40.6 43.9 0.7 2.5 9.3 41.2 46.3
Iceland 3.3 6.5 16.5 37.5 36.2
Ireland 1.5 12.6 12.9 51.6 21.5 2.3 9.4 11.4 43.5 33.5 1.6 8.2 10.7 47.7 31.8
Italy 0.6 5.4 8.1 36.3 49.5
Latvia 1.1 5.2 11.4 43.1 39.2
Lithuania 0.9 4.9 13.2 55.1 25.8 0.2 2.8 6.6 47.9 42.4 0.2 1.4 6.5 50.8 41.0 0.4 1.9 8.1 38.2 51.4
Netherlands 3.6 21.1 18.9 41.7 14.6 3.3 21.6 16.3 42.0 16.8 3.5 21.5 16.2 44.1 14.7 2.8 21.3 17.8 39.5 18.7 2.9 17.6 16.7 44.9 18.0
Norway 2.3 16.1 20.8 45.9 14.9 2.9 19.2 23.0 41.9 13.0 2.2 17.0 23.8 43.5 13.5 2.1 16.0 23.2 40.9 17.9
Poland 2.5 11.4 11.2 49.1 25.8 2.6 12.2 9.4 47.2 28.6 1.7 8.6 10.9 40.8 38.0 3.0 7.4 10.3 40.5 38.8 2.6 10.0 13.3 47.0 27.1
Portugal 0.1 4.4 5.4 56.4 33.8 0.2 2.4 4.1 48.2 45.1 0.6 1.5 3.6 47.8 46.7 0.7 3.6 7.8 43.1 44.9
Romania 0.8 3.1 14.2 41.8 40.0
Slovakia 1.7 9.1 16.8 42.0 30.5 1.4 5.9 10.6 38.4 43.7 0.9 4.9 12.8 37.8 43.6
Slovenia 0.9 4.7 7.5 50.0 37.0 0.9 4.1 5.4 43.2 46.4 0.7 4.8 5.8 40.0 48.8 1.2 6.9 8.5 38.1 45.3 0.7 4.8 7.4 44.5 42.7
Spain 0.9 6.6 12.1 51.7 28.6 0.9 6.9 11.2 48.3 32.7 0.7 6.2 9.1 46.7 37.3 1.1 4.6 7.5 36.3 50.5
Sweden 1.0 10.8 23.2 45.0 20.0 1.4 11.1 22.3 46.5 18.6 1.0 8.0 20.6 47.4 23.0 1.3 8.4 21.4 47.3 21.6 1.2 9.4 24.8 47.2 17.3
Switzerland 1.6 15.8 15.0 46.4 21.2 2.9 14.8 14.2 46.2 21.9 2.2 12.6 16.1 46.6 22.4 4.4 18.3 18.2 41.2 18.0
UK 2.9 17.9 19.1 41.5 18.6 3.1 17.0 17.2 46.9 15.8 2.4 16.0 18.1 45.0 18.5 2.9 15.2 18.1 41.5 22.3
Total 2.5 10.9 14.4 43.2 29.0 2.4 10.3 12.8 41.2 33.3 2.2 9.5 13.3 42.3 32.7 2.7 10.8 14.2 41.2 31.0 2.5 10.9 15.7 44.7 26.2
Note: Category 1 indicates ‘Strongly disagree’, 2 ‘Disagree’, 3 0Neither agree nor disagree’, 4 0Agree, and 5 0Strongly agree’. The individual must indicate how much agree is with the statement “The
government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”.
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Proportion of net tax benefit recipients by country and survey year, 2008–2016
Country Round 2008 Round 2010 Round 2012 Round 2014 Round 2016 Total16Austria 0.500 0.478 0.496 0.481 0.489
Belgium 0.472 0.496 0.488 0.480 0.511 0.490
Bulgaria 0.574 0.659 0.600 0.613
Croatia 0.481 0.581 0.534
Cyprus 0.433 0.506 0.438 0.455
Czech Re 0.560 0.762 0.114 0.159 0.187 0.366
Denmark 0.085 0.143 0.122 0.171 0.130
Estonia 0.126 0.118 0.580 0.584 0.605 0.434
Finland 0.467 0.552 0.556 0.534 0.556 0.532
France 0.535 0.558 0.566 0.535 0.547 0.548
Germany 0.474 0.474 0.477 0.451 0.435 0.462
Greece 0.380 0.394 0.388
Hungary 0.828 0.753 0.644 0.287 0.628
Iceland 0.575 0.575
Ireland 0.686 0.742 0.721 0.717
Italy 0.432 0.432
Latvia 0.615 0.615
Lithuania 0.533 0.680 0.412 0.480 0.515
Netherlands 0.373 0.376 0.387 0.438 0.421 0.400
Norway 0.249 0.272 0.223 0.197 0.236
Poland 0.397 0.240 0.313 0.397 0.390 0.345
Portugal 0.632 0.614 0.676 0.610 0.632
Romania 0.595 0.595
Slovakia 0.617 0.701 0.678 0.663
Slovenia 0.674 0.642 0.703 0.674 0.581 0.652
Spain 0.428 0.474 0.519 0.533 0.488
Sweden 0.059 0.216 0.139 0.271 0.118 0.159
Switzerland 0.326 0.264 0.271 0.287 0.288
UK 0.550 0.591 0.599 0.521 0.564
Total 0.463 0.491 0.457 0.449 0.446 0.463Table A4
Taxes, in-cash benefits (in PPP Euros) and the proportion of positive net benefit recipients by country, using sample from EU-SILC, 2008–2016Country Taxes Benefits Receives positive net benefits NAustria 14,498.3 13,862.2 0.494 23,937
Belgium 11,520.8 11,469.0 0.467 27,345
Bulgaria 660.2 1919.2 0.713 16,837
Croatia 2231.9 3783.9 0.651 9521
Cyprus 4513.0 10,683.4 0.568 12,431
Czech Republic 2110.4 4347.9 0.589 43,602
Denmark 27,826.1 14,918.9 0.369 22,965
Estonia 2257.4 3717.0 0.592 27,397
Finland 15,600.0 11,694.4 0.465 51,794
France 9400.3 14,075.7 0.559 55,722
Germany 11,555.4 12,846.5 0.506 65,278
Greece 5602.2 7440.3 0.546 12,631
Hungary 1823.7 3409.9 0.618 38,197
Iceland 17,218.4 10,303.8 0.350 2989
Ireland 9235.5 15,158.9 0.667 14,447
Italy 10,950.4 11,114.2 0.507 19,538
Latvia 1716.6 2789.2 0.647 6247
Lithuania 1395.7 3054.0 0.639 20,602
Netherlands 21,283.4 10,602.5 0.368 53,454
Norway 27,129.1 19,114.8 0.404 22,482
Poland 2841.8 3600.5 0.557 63,834
Portugal 4661.2 7150.6 0.587 28,907
Romania 746.3 1656.2 0.665 7711
Slovakia 1557.5 3742.6 0.607 15,866
Slovenia 7572.0 8055.4 0.527 44,067
Spain 5266.0 8743.9 0.545 50,462
Sweden 15,779.9 15,823.6 0.477 32,249
Switzerland 25,961.5 18,222.4 0.364 29,683
United Kingdom 8291.1 11,352.9 0.587 35,904Total 9881.8 9619.0 0.527 856,099
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Robustness check: OLS coefficients for Receiving positive net benefits. Direct reference to Table 2
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)17PR ¼
1,2,3,4,5PR ¼ 4,5 vs
1,2,3PR ¼
1,2,3,4,5PR ¼ 4,5 vs
1,2,3PR ¼
1,2,3,4,5PR ¼ 4,5 vs
1,2,3PR ¼
1,2,3,4,5PR ¼ 4,5 vs
1,2,3Receiving pos. net ben. 0.0207
(0.0129)0.0057
(0.0055)0.0222*
(0.0128)0.0062
(0.0055)0.0219*
(0.0123)0.0063
(0.0053)0.0045
(0.0163)0.0013
(0.0075)Left 0.2575***
(0.0271)0.1021***
(0.0128)Right 0.2880***
(0.0266)0.1085***
(0.0121)Left*I(net benefit>0) 0.0622***
(0.0225)0.0307***
(0.0102)Right*I(net benefit>0) 0.1169***
(0.0204)0.0461***
(0.0092)Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income sources Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market income
inequalities
No No No No Yes Yes Yes YesSocial contrib. and tax
revenuesNo No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesN 150,543 150,543 150,543 150,543 150,543 150,543 136,267 136,267
R2 0.124 0.100 0.124 0.100 0.125 0.100 0.157 0.126***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. Models report OLS coefficients on preferences for redistributions measures on a cardinal 1–5 scale (models 1, 3, 5, 7)
and for an indicator for items 4 and 5 (agrees or strongly agrees to the statement “The government should take measures to reduce differences in
income levels”) (models 2, 4, 6, 8). Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered by country.
Table A6
Robustness check: OLS coefficients for various treatments compared to average effect on the outcome based on order probit
Outcome Receives positive net Percentile in net benefits ben/tax 2 (benefits-taxes)/avg taxes in the country (in
benefits distributions [1.00,2.00[ SD units)(1) (2) (3) (4)Strongly disagree (1) 0.0035***
(0.001)0.00003*
(0)0.0018*
(0.001)0.0018**
(0.001)Disagree (2) 0.0076***
(0.003)0.00006
(0)0.0048**
(0.002)0.0048***
(0.002)Neither (3) 0.0051***
(0.002)0.00003
(0)0.0038**
(0.002)0.0038***
(0.001)Agree (4) 0.0015**
(0.001)0.00002
(0)0.0008**
(0)0.0008***
(0)Strongly agree (5) 0.0147***
(0.005)0.0001
(0)0.0112**
(0.006)0.0112***
(0.004)Average effect on
probabilities0.0036 0.0000 0.0021 0.0020Average effect on outcome 0.0456 0.0003 0.0301 0.0299OLS marginal effect 0.0219*
(0.0123)0.0016*
(0.0008)0.0317**
(0.0143)0.0282**
(0.0121)N 150,543 150,543 150,543 150,543
R2 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250 0.1253***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The top panel displays average marginal effects for each outcome category, based on ordered probit estimates. The
average effect on the outcome is based on the 1–5 scale assigned to preference for redistribution variable. The bottom panel reports OLS coefficients
based on the 1–5 scale for preferences for redistribution. Each column corresponds to one specific treatment. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust
and clustered by country. Standard errors for average effects on probabilities and on outcomes are not reported.
Fig. A.1. Density of benefits and taxes at the country level: ESS (solid line) and EU-SUILC (dashed).
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